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STILL “SNOWING” IN THE SUNSHINE STATE:  
AN ANALYSIS OF AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE 
LACK OF PROTECTION FROM EMPLOYER RETALIATION 
FOR FLORIDA LAWYERS WHO ADHERE TO THE STATE’S 
MANDATORY REPORTING OF PROFESSIONAL 
MISCONDUCT RULE 
Jason A. Anon* 
ABSTRACT 
The Preamble to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct establishes 
lawyers as “officers of the court” and recognizes the self-governing nature of 
the legal profession. As such, in addition to requiring adherence to the rules, 
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct also endow all lawyers with the 
responsibility of ensuring other lawyers’ adherence to the rules. This charge 
of responsibility is directly stated in Section 4-8, Maintaining the Integrity of 
the Profession. More specifically, subsection (a) of Rule 4-8.3, Reporting 
Professional Misconduct, explicitly requires “[a] lawyer who knows that 
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects [to] inform the 
appropriate professional authority.” 
Although Rule 4-8.3(a) requires lawyers to report such misconduct, the 
Rules fail to provide any express protection for lawyers who are retaliated 
against by employers because they report (or insist on reporting) the 
misconduct of other lawyers. Furthermore, Florida courts do not recognize 
the common law tort cause of action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge; 
the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida has also held that Florida 
lawyers are precluded from redress under Florida’s Private Sector 
Whistleblower Act when they are retaliated against by an employer for 
adhering to (or insisting on adherence to) Florida’s mandatory reporting 
requirement; and Florida courts will not find a breach of the contractual 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (unless an express term of the 
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Rosario Lozada Schrier, Associate Professor of Legal Skills and Values, for inspiring this Comment and 
for her unceasing dedication and guidance throughout the drafting process. Many thanks to the Editorial 
Board and Staff of the FIU Law Review for their unrelenting efforts in seeing this Comment through to 
final publication. To Mom, Dad, Mike, Ale, and the rest of my family and friends for your unparalleled 
support and encouragement. And to Gabrielle Aurora for always believing in me, brightening my darkest 
days, and filling my life with inspiration, meaning, and purpose. 
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at-will employment contract has been breached) in situations where at-will 
lawyers are similarly retaliated against. 
Thus, given the tension between the mandatory reporting requirement 
of Rule 4-8.3(a) and the lack of protection from employer retaliation for 
lawyers who report or insist on reporting the misconduct of other lawyers, 
(1) Florida courts should recognize in such situations a tort cause of action 
for retaliatory or wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy, (2) 
the Florida Legislature should redraft the Definitions section of the Florida 
Private Sector Whistleblower Act to include the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct into the definition of “[l]aw, rule, or regulation,” (3) Florida courts 
should allow claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing with respect to at-will lawyers’ employment contracts in such 
situations, or (4) the Florida Supreme Court should draft a new rule (or 
alternatively include as a provision or comment under Rule 4-8.4, 
Misconduct) in the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct proscribing such 
employer retaliation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After completing three long years of law school and passing the Florida 
Bar Examination, you are finally hired as an associate at a private law firm, 
a position that you have been searching for tirelessly since becoming a 
licensed attorney in the State of Florida. While it has surely taken some time 
and effort to adjust from law school to law firm life, you find yourself settling 
in with your workload and becoming familiar with your firm’s culture and 
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operations.1 However, after several months of work, you begin to realize that 
occasionally some of the firm’s practices (as well as the conduct of some of 
the other lawyers) are not always as entirely forthright as they should be. For 
example, some of the improprieties you might observe are that the work of 
junior associates—including your own—is occasionally inadequately 
supervised; clients are sometimes provided altered copies of documents that 
were supposedly filed as-is with the court; firm performance evaluations and 
client billing statements are sometimes partially fabricated; and one of your 
supervisors has falsely represented to the firm on a few occasions that he 
prepared a document when he had actually never even read it.2 
As you make these observations, you remember sitting in your law 
school professional responsibility courses or professional ethics seminars and 
learning about the high standards to which lawyers are held because of their 
positions of trust within the community and their “special responsibility for 
the quality of justice.”3 You also know that as members of the Florida Bar, 
you and your colleagues are held to heightened professional standards, 
including the mandatory duty to report serious professional misconduct that 
reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.4 At the same time, however, you 
mentally juggle your professional duties and obligations against other 
considerations, such as being labeled as a “snitch” or “rat” within the firm, 
being ostracized by your supervisors and coworkers, earning the reputation 
of a “troublemaker” within the legal community (and suffering the associated 
employment consequences as a result, for example), and even facing 
employer retaliation such as demotion or termination for reporting or 
insisting on reporting this professional misconduct consistent with your 
professional responsibilities.5 
While you consider simply “looking the other way” after contemplating 
the potential consequences or effects that could result from a disturbance of 
 
1 See Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 199, 201 (2007). 
2 These facts loosely represent the situation in Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & 
Floam, 715 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
3 FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (THE FLA. BAR 2012) (“As a public citizen, a lawyer 
should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice, and the 
quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should 
cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law, 
and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public’s understanding of 
and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system, because legal institutions in a constitutional 
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.”). 
4 See id. at r. 4-8.3(a). 
5 Douglas R. Richmond, Associates as Snitches and Rats, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1997); 
see also Terri Martin Kirik, Retaliatory Discharge for Attorney-Employees in Private Practice: To Do, or 
Not To Do, the “Right Thing”, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 383, 383–84 (2000). 
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your firm’s current equilibrium,6 you ultimately decide to report the 
professional misconduct you have observed to your supervising attorney. 
First, you understand the foundational importance behind your duty to report 
such misconduct.7 Second, you want to avoid being complicit and included 
as part of the misconduct or otherwise subjected to disciplinary action. And 
third, you think that even if your employing law firm did terminate or 
otherwise retaliate against you, you would surely be protected by some sort 
of remedy given that, after all, you were simply following a mandatory 
obligation to report under the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.8 But 
think again. 
The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct entrust all lawyers licensed 
to practice in the State of Florida with the responsibility of maintaining the 
integrity of the legal profession by not only adhering to the rules themselves, 
but also by ensuring other lawyers’ adherence to the rules: “A lawyer who 
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform 
the appropriate professional authority.”9 While “[r]eporting on a member of 
your own profession is usually an unpleasant act,10 . . . it is necessary for the 
protection of the public because co-professionals are often the only people 
who become aware of misconduct.”11 As a parallel, concrete example, most 
people would likely want the doctors in an operating room to report a fellow 
 
6 See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ill. 1998) (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“[A]s 
unfortunate for society as it may be, attorneys are no less human than nonattorneys and, thus, no less given 
to the temptation to either ignore or rationalize away their ethical obligations when complying therewith 
may render them unable to feed and support their families.”). 
7 See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109 (N.Y. 1992) (“The reporting requirement is nothing 
less than essential to the survival of the [legal] profession.”) (internal citations omitted). 
8 See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.3(a) (THE FLA. BAR 2012). 
9 Id.; see also id. at pmbl. (“[E]very lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of 
these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest that it 
serves.”). 
10 Lawyers are reluctant to report their peers because of widespread ambivalence about or negative 
attitudes toward self-reporting, ignorance, and fear of retaliation. The rate of reporting for lawyers 
working in the same firm is lower still for at least two reasons. First, lawyers feel greater loyalty to 
their colleagues. Second, because co-workers often have exclusive knowledge of another lawyer’s 
misconduct, they more acutely fear discovery and retaliation. 
Richmond, supra note 5, at 1838. 
11 LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 92 (4th 
ed. 2016); see also Sandra J. Mullings, Wieder v. Skala: A Chink in the Armor of the At-Will Doctrine or 
a Lance for Law Firm Associates?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 963, 994 (1995) (“[P]rofessional peers are in 
the best position to detect misconduct and, therefore, to serve the public interest of identifying and 
removing incompetent or unethical practitioners.”). 
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doctor or surgeon to authorities if they knew he was intoxicated during an 
operation.12 
But the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct are silent on the issue of 
protections for lawyers who are retaliated against by their employing law 
firms for reporting or insisting on reporting the misconduct of other lawyers. 
Additionally, Florida courts do not recognize the common law tort cause of 
action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge;13 the Second District Court of 
Appeal of Florida has also held that Florida lawyers are precluded from 
redress under Florida’s Private Sector Whistleblower Act14 when they are 
retaliated against by an employer for adhering to (or insisting on adherence 
to) Florida’s mandatory reporting requirement;15 and Florida courts will not 
find a breach of the contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing (unless an express term of the at-will employment contract has been 
breached) in situations where at-will lawyers are similarly retaliated 
against.16 
Thus, given the tension between the mandatory reporting requirement 
of Rule 4-8.3(a) and the lack of protection from employer retaliation for 
lawyers who report or insist on reporting the misconduct of other lawyers, 
(1) Florida courts should recognize in such situations a tort cause of action 
for retaliatory or wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy, (2) 
the Florida Legislature should redraft the Definitions section of the Florida 
Private Sector Whistleblower Act to include the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct into the definition of “[l]aw, rule, or regulation,” (3) Florida courts 
should allow claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
 
12 LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 11. 
13 See Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof’l Adm’rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983); DeMarco v. 
Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980) (affirming and adopting reasoning of 
DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)); Hartley v. Ocean Reef 
Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
14 Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101–.105 (2017). 
15 Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 896 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). Although this case represents a decision from a mid-level Florida District Court of Appeal, its 
dictates are entirely significant because the Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that Florida district 
courts’ decisions “represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled” by it. Pardo v. State, 
596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980)). “[I]n the 
absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.” Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 
666 (citing Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985)). Furthermore,  
in the event the only case on point on a district level is from a district other than the one in which 
the trial court is located, the trial court [is] required to follow that decision. . . . Contrarily, as between 
District Courts of Appeal, a sister district’s opinion is merely persuasive. 
Id. at 666–67 (quoting State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)). 
16 See Snow, 896 So. 2d at 791–92; Ins. Concepts and Design, Inc. v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 785 
So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th 
Cir. 1999); Hospital Corp. of America v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 710 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
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dealing with respect to at-will lawyers’ employment contracts in such 
situations, or (4) the Florida Supreme Court should draft a new rule (or 
alternatively, include as a provision or comment under Rule 4-8.4, 
Misconduct) in the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct proscribing such 
employer retaliation. By applying these potential solutions to the ironic 
paradox existing between a mandatory reporting of professional misconduct 
rule and a lack of attorney protection from employer retaliation for lawyers 
adhering to the reporting rule, Florida lawyers will no longer be “left out in 
the cold” by Snow v. Ruden, McClosky et al., Florida’s at-will employment 
doctrine, or the silence of the Rules themselves. 
Part II of this Comment provides the background and framework 
underlying the tension between the mandatory reporting requirement and the 
lack of protection against employer retaliation for lawyers. This section 
analyzes Rule 4-8.3(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, 
discusses the importance of adhering to the mandatory reporting requirement, 
and surveys Florida retaliatory or wrongful discharge law (including an 
analysis of the Florida Private Sector Whistleblower Act) and Florida at-will 
employment contract law. Part III examines the Florida District Court of 
Appeal case currently dictating Florida’s position on this issue, as well as 
analyzes case examples from other jurisdictions that have adopted positions 
similar to Florida’s. On the other hand, Part IV presents case examples from 
jurisdictions that have responded more favorably to the issue for reporting 
lawyers; and these cases offer guidelines for potential solutions to the 
predicament in Florida. Additionally, this section addresses the possibility of 
a legislative solution to the issue as well as a partial solution involving the 
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct themselves. Last, Part V summarizes 
where Florida currently stands and where it should be heading. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct in Florida:  
Rule 4-8.3(a) 
Rule 4-8.3(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct consists of 
three parts: a knowledge requirement, a gauge of the severity of the 
professional misconduct that must be reported, and a mandatory reporting 
obligation. First, the language of Rule 4-8.3(a) is couched in terms of a 
lawyer’s knowledge of another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.17 “The standard for assessing knowledge is objective. The 
knowledge must be more than a mere suspicion that misconduct has occurred. 
 
17 See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.3(a) (THE FLA. BAR 2012). 
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The question is whether ‘a reasonable lawyer in the circumstances would 
have a firm opinion that the conduct in question more likely than not 
occurred.’”18 
Next, the mandatory reporting requirement under Rule 4-8.3(a) is 
qualified by the language “raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”19 The major 
implication of this language, which is also the source of considerable 
confusion and significant “gray area,” is that not all violations of the Florida 
Rules of Professional Conduct trigger Rule 4-8.3(a)’s mandatory reporting 
requirement.20 As the comment to the rule indicates, the “reporting obligation 
[is limited] to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously 
endeavor to prevent. . . . The term ‘substantial’ refers to the seriousness of 
the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is 
aware.”21 Accordingly, where a lawyer observes professional or ethical 
misconduct, such as noticing a colleague neglecting work because of 
substance abuse, encountering an opposing counsel who intentionally 
obstructs discovery, or being asked to falsify time records by a supervisor,22 
the qualification in Rule 4-8.3(a) requires the lawyer to examine whether 
reporting the other lawyer’s misconduct is obligated because its severity or 
relation to the practice of law “raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”23 
Furthermore, in terms of determining whether the severity of a particular 
instance of professional misconduct has triggered an attorney’s mandatory 
reporting obligation, Rule 4-8.4, Misconduct, and its comment provide 
additional guidance into this inquiry; the Rule explicitly proscribes specific 
actions and conduct that are per se misconduct (based on their inclusion in 
the rule proscribing misconduct) and would thus trigger the reporting 
requirement.24 The Rule’s comment also provides the following explanation: 
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to 
practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the 
 
18 See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 11 at 91 (quoting Restatement § 5 cmt. i). 
19 FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.3(a) (THE FLA. BAR 2012) (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at r. 4-8.3 cmt. 3 (“If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the rules, the failure 
to report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many 
jurisdictions, but proved to be unenforceable.”). 
21 Id. at cmt. 2 (Along these lines, “[a] report about misconduct is [also] not required where it 
would involve violation of rule 4-1.6 [(Confidentiality of Information)]. However, a lawyer should 
encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client’s 
interests.”). 
22 LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 11 at 91. 
23 FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.3(a) (THE FLA. BAR 2012) (emphasis added). 
24 See id. at r. 4-8.4. The Rule begins with the broad proscription, “[a] lawyer shall not:” before 
proceeding to enumerate various actions and conduct (a)–(i) explicitly deemed misconduct under the Rule. 
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offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. 
However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. 
Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses 
involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed 
to include offenses concerning some matters of personal 
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that 
have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. 
Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire 
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable 
only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics 
relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, 
dishonesty, or breach of trust or serious interference with the 
administration of justice are in that category.25 
Lastly, the word “shall” in Rule 4-8.3(a) is significant because it makes 
the professional reporting requirement mandatory.26 As opposed to many 
other rules and comments in the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which merely recommend courses of action or provide guidelines,27 Rule 4-
8.3(a) makes it such that a lawyer with knowledge of another lawyer’s 
“violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects” must report it to the “appropriate professional authority.”28 
B. The Significance of Reporting Professional Misconduct 
While Florida and the vast majority of states have adopted mandatory 
reporting rules, relatively few public disciplinary reports have been issued in 
which lawyers are disciplined for failing to adhere to their reporting 
obligations.29 Scholars recognize, however, that lawyers in several states 
have indeed been sanctioned in various instances for failing to report, 
although formal opinions on the matters were never published.30 In any 
regard, state courts maintain the importance of self-regulation of the legal 
profession and take seriously attorneys’ failures to report misconduct under 
 
25 Id. at cmt. 1 (Furthermore, “[a] pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance 
when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.”). 
26  Id. at r. 4-8.3(a). 
27 See id. at pmbl. (“Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms of ‘must,’ ‘must not,’ or 
‘may not.’ These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in 
the term ‘may,’ are permissive and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has discretion to 
exercise professional judgment.”). 
28  Id. at r. 4-8.3(a). 
29 See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 11 at 91. 
30 Id. at 94 n.91. 
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mandatory reporting rules of professional conduct as exemplified in a 
groundbreaking case, In re Himmel.31 
In In re Himmel, Tammy Forsberg retained Attorney Casey to represent 
her in a personal injury/property damage case resulting from a motorcycle 
accident.32 A $35,000 settlement was negotiated, and pursuant to his 
agreement with Forsberg, Casey was entitled to one-third of any money 
received as his attorney fee.33 Nonetheless, Casey ended up converting the 
funds received, and Forsberg retained Attorney Himmel to collect her money, 
agreeing to pay Himmel one-third of any money recovered.34 Accordingly, 
Himmel then drafted an agreement in which Casey agreed to pay Forsberg 
$75,000 in exchange for Forsberg’s agreement to not initiate any criminal, 
civil, or disciplinary actions against Casey.35 When Casey subsequently 
failed to pay, however, Himmel then filed suit against Casey and obtained a 
$100,000 judgment was entered against Casey.36 
The issue before the Supreme Court of Illinois was that Himmel had 
“received unprivileged information that Casey converted Forsberg’s funds, 
and that [Himmel] failed to relate the information to the Commission in 
violation of Rule 1 -- 103(a) of the Code.”37 Recognizing the emphasis of the 
“importance of a lawyer’s duty to report misconduct,” the court found that 
the information Himmel possessed regarding Casey’s conduct was not 
protected by the attorney–client privilege and so was not exempt from the 
reporting rule.38 This was because (1) Forsberg did not communicate the 
information to Himmel in confidence because she voluntarily discussed the 
matter with Himmel in the presence of third parties such as her mother and 
fiancé, and (2) the information was intended to be disclosed by Himmel (with 
Forsberg’s consent) to third parties such as the insurance company involved, 
the insurance company’s lawyer, and Casey himself.39 As such, the court 
concluded that Himmel “possessed unprivileged knowledge of Casey’s 
conversion of client funds, which [was] illegal conduct involving moral 
 
31 See id. at 93. 
32 In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Ill. 1988). For this case and subsequent cases discussed in 
this Comment, an in-depth description of the facts surrounding each is provided to (1) further highlight 
the frequency with which examples of the quandary addressed in this Comment arise and (2) offer a look 
into the reality of the situation each lawyer faced when confronting this “Catch-22” dilemma. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 792. 
38 Id. at 793–94. 
39 Id. at 794. 
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turpitude, and that [Himmel] failed in his duty to report such misconduct to 
the Commission.”40 
After finding that Himmel violated his duty to report, the court 
determined that Himmel should be publicly disciplined to uphold the 
purposes of the disciplinary process such as maintaining the integrity of the 
legal profession, protecting the administration of justice, and safeguarding 
the public.41 The court thus suspended Himmel from the practice of law for 
one year based on the “serious nature of [his] failure to report Casey, the 
resulting interference with the Commission’s investigation of Casey, and 
[Himmel’s] ill-advised choice to settle with Casey rather than report his 
misconduct.”42 
As another example, in In re Condit, Attorney Lawrence Condit settled 
his client’s claim alleging legal malpractice, conversion, embezzlement, 
fraud, and conflict of interest against the client’s former attorney, Eldridge.43 
Upon Eldridge’s breach of the settlement agreement, Condit and his client 
brought suit against Eldridge, and Eldridge’s lawyers then responded by 
filing a bar complaint against Condit for violating the state’s mandatory 
reporting requirement when he failed to report Eldridge’s misconduct.44 
Subsequently, Condit and the State Bar entered into a discipline by consent 
agreement under which Condit admitted to violating state mandatory 
reporting requirements and agreed to be publicly censured and to pay for all 
of the State Bar’s litigation costs and expenses.45 However, the state 
disciplinary commission rejected the agreement and remanded the case to the 
State Bar for the filing of a complaint against Condit.46 
Both Condit and the State Bar then appealed to the Arizona Supreme 
Court, certifying the question of whether the state ethical rule regarding the 
confidentiality of information relating to the representation of a client 
preempted Condit’s duty to report Eldridge’s professional misconduct under 
state mandatory reporting requirements.47 Declining to entirely handle the 
issue and set straight the existing interplay between the confidentiality and 
reporting ethical rules, the court nonetheless determined that when Condit 
 
40 Id. at 793–95. The court made this finding over Himmel’s arguments that he did not report 
Casey’s conduct because he was respecting his client’s wishes (and not motivated by his own financial 
gain) and Forsberg had approved/accepted his actions. 
41 Id. at 795. 
42 Id. at 796. 
43 In re Condit, No. SB-94-0021-D, 1995 Ariz. Unpub. LEXIS 5, *1–2 (Mar. 14, 1995). The 
parties’ negotiated settlement included in its terms a confidentiality agreement. 
44 Id. at *2. 
45 Id. at *1–2. 
46 Id. at *2. The commission’s primary concern arose out of the confidentiality term included in 
the settlement agreement between Condit’s client and Eldridge. 
47 Id. at *3. 
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brought suit “against Eldridge, the alleged acts of misconduct became a 
matter of public record.”48 Thus, the court explained that once Condit filed 
the lawsuit, there was nothing left to be kept confidential, and he was 
therefore unprotected from his failure to report Eldridge by the state client 
confidentiality ethical rule.49 As such, after weighing considerations 
including, inter alia, the conduct in the case occurring several years before 
In re Himmel was decided and the avoidance of further delay in finalizing the 
matter, the court ultimately approved of Condit’s discipline by consent 
agreement and public censure for violating state mandatory reporting 
requirements.50 
Ultimately, however, notwithstanding the possible consequences (such 
as affirmative discipline or public reprimand) of failing to report misconduct 
under mandatory reporting rules of professional conduct, “[a]ccountability 
within the legal profession through self-regulation is a crucial component of 
its autonomy, internal integrity, and reputation among the . . . public. The 
duty to self-regulate contains elements of both furthering the public’s interest 
in trustworthy guardians of the law, as well as protecting the integrity of the 
legal profession.”51 Thus, even if an attorney is licensed in a jurisdiction that 
less readily disciplines lawyers for failing to report professional misconduct, 
the “ends” the duty to report is aimed at achieving—“maintain[ing] the 
integrity of the legal profession, further[ing] the ends of justice, and 
protect[ing] the public from unscrupulous attorneys”—should be achieved 
regardless of the probability of discipline or a given state’s proclivity to 
discipline lawyers.52 
C. Florida Retaliatory or Wrongful Discharge Law 
Florida has long been recognized as an at-will employment state.53 This 
means that in Florida, “where the term of employment is discretionary with 
either party or indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate it at 
any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the employment 
 
48 Id. at *4. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at *5. 
51 Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Current Development 2002-2003: A Current Look at Model 
Rule 8.3: How is it Used and What are Courts Doing About it?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 758 (2003). 
52 Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 13 (Ill. 2000). 
53 See Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof’l Adm’rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983); DeMarco v. 
Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980) (affirming and adopting reasoning of 
DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 
79 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1955); Kimberly A. McCoy, Litigating Under the Florida Private Sector Whistle-
Blower’s Act: Plaintiff Protection and Good Faith, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 859 (1998). 
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contract.”54 In Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., the Third District Court of 
Appeal of Florida considered a claim for retaliatory discharge of an at-will 
employee where the discharge on the part of the employer contravened the 
public’s policy interests.55 In its analysis of determining “what constitutes 
public policy, or which of competing public policies should be given 
precedence,” the court exercised judicial restraint and deferred the 
determination to the legislature.56 As such, the court concluded “that a 
significant change in the law such as the creation of a cause of action for 
retaliatory or wrongful discharge in this state is best left to the legislature.”57 
Therefore, the court held that “a common law cause of action for retaliatory 
or wrongful discharge does not exist in Florida.”58 
In 1991, however, the Florida Legislature passed Sections 448.101–.105 
of the Florida Statutes (commonly referred to as Florida’s Private Sector 
Whistleblower Act) to protect whistleblowing private sector employees from 
employer retaliation.59 Section 448.102 prohibits private employers from 
“tak[ing] any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because the 
employee has” done one of the following: 
(1) Disclosed, or threatened to disclose, to any appropriate 
governmental agency, under oath, in writing, an activity, 
 
54 DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136 (aff’d per curiam, DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254); see also Hartley 
v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“The established rule in 
Florida is that when the term of employment is discretionary or indefinite, either party may terminate the 
employment at any time for any reason or no reason without assuming any liability.”). 
55 Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1328 (The employee was fired after “refus[ing] to build or order his 
workers to construct or plan any facilities without proper government approval.”). This section focuses on 
Hartley because the public policy concern at issue in Hartley is comparable to the public’s policy interest 
in ensuring the integrity and trustworthiness of the legal profession via a mandatory reporting requirement. 
See Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1043, 1063 (2008) (“[T]he public unquestionably has a substantial interest in insuring that attorneys 
comply with both the letter and spirit of the ethical rules governing attorneys. . . . [T]he very existence 
and enforcement of such rules contributes to public confidence in the judicial process.”). 
56 Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1329. 
57 Id. The court reached this conclusion after acknowledging various jurisdictions’ approval of the 
tort cause of action of retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy. See id. at 1328–29. 
58 Id. at 1330 (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof’l Adm’rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 
184 (Fla. 1983) (“Some jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to [the employment at-will] rule and one 
exception takes the form of a common law tort for retaliatory discharge. Florida has not followed that 
path.”). 
59 See Richard D. Tuschman, III, Another Look at the Notice Requirement of the Florida Private 
Sector Whistleblower’s Act, 71 FLA. B. J. 10, 43 (1997) (“The Florida private sector Whistleblower’s 
Act . . . prohibits employers from taking an adverse employment action against an employee because the 
employee has disclosed, threatened to disclose, objected to, or refused to participate in a violation of 
law.”); McCoy, supra note 53, at 860; cf. Burden v. City of Opa Locka, No. 11-22018, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 144903, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2012) (“Florida’s [public sector] Whistle-blower’s Act was 
enacted with the intent to prevent retaliatory action against employees and persons who disclose 
government wrongdoing to the appropriate officials.”) (citing WHISTLEBLOWER’S ACT, FLA. STAT. § 
112.3187(2) (2017)). 
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policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of a 
law, rule, or regulation; (2) Provided information to, or 
testified before, any appropriate governmental agency, 
person, or entity conducting an investigation, hearing, or 
inquiry into an alleged violation of a law, rule, or regulation 
by the employer; or (3) Objected to, or refused to participate 
in, any activity, policy, or practice of the employer which is 
in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.60 
As a result, Section 448.102 seems to provide an express protection and 
remedy for lawyers who have been retaliated against by their employing law 
firms for reporting or threatening to report the professional misconduct of 
other lawyers. However, as discussed further in Part III below, the Florida 
Second District Court of Appeal in Snow v. Ruden, McClosky et al. has 
narrowly interpreted the meaning of the word “rule” under the Definitions 
section of the statute and deferred to the legislature to resolve the ironic 
paradox existing between Rule 4-8.3(a) and the lack of protection from 
employer retaliation for lawyers who adhere to their reporting obligation.61 
D. Florida At-Will Employment Contract Law and the Implied 
Covenant of Good  Faith and Fair Dealing 
Under Florida contract law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is built into every contract.62 The covenant arises out of the implied 
understanding that under a contractual agreement, each party mutually 
promises to perform its obligations in good faith while expecting the other 
party to similarly perform.63 As such, the covenant functions to ensure that 
the contracting parties’ reasonable commercial expectations are protected in 
light of their agreement.64 
 
60 FLORIDA PRIVATE SECTOR WHISTLEBLOWER’S ACT, FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (2017). Subsection 
(1) of Section 448.102 applies only when “the employee has, in writing, brought the activity, policy, or 
practice to the attention of a supervisor or the employer and has afforded the employer a reasonable 
opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or practice.” 
61 See Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 896 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
62 See, e.g., Cty. of Brevard v. Miorelli Eng’g, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 1997) (“Virtually 
every contract contains implied covenants and conditions. For example, every contract includes an implied 
covenant that the parties will perform in good faith.”) (quoting Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Ins. Concepts and Design, Inc. v. Healthplan 
Servs., Inc., 785 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 
1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). 
63 See Cox v. CSX Intermodal Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
First Nationwide Bank v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1991)). 
64 See, e.g., Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of the Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247, 251 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009); Ins. Concepts and Design, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 1234; Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1097. 
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However, beyond acknowledging that the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing exists in every contractual relationship, Florida courts 
consistently adhere to restricting the reach of the implied covenant.65 For 
example, Florida courts maintain that the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing should not be invoked to vary or override the express terms of a 
contract.66 Additionally, as discussed further in Part III below, a cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot 
be maintained under Florida contract law unless an express term of the 
contract has been breached.67 
III. A LACK OF PROTECTION FROM EMPLOYER RETALIATION 
Given that Rule 4-8.3(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 
imposes such a strict, mandatory reporting requirement, it would seem to 
follow that the law would protect lawyers who are retaliated against by their 
employing law firms when they uphold their ethical duties to report 
misconduct under mandatory reporting rules of professional conduct. 
However, as the following examples illustrate, that is not always the case. 
In Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., Plaintiff 
Ann E. Snow appealed the dismissal of her two-count second amended 
complaint against her former law firm.68 She alleged (1) “a violation of 
section 448.101(2)–(3), Florida Statutes (1999),” and (2) “that her 
termination of employment was a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith in her at-will employment contract as well as a violation of public 
policy.”69 Snow, a member of the Florida Bar, had been hired as an associate 
by the law firm Ruden, McClosky when she discovered that her supervisor 
had improperly diverted fees to himself that were owed to the law firm.70 
Snow’s claim was that as an attorney licensed in Florida she was ethically 
 
65 See, e.g., Burger King Corp., 169 F.3d at 1316 (“The Florida District Courts of Appeal have 
held unequivocally that the rights conferred by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are 
limited.”); Snow, 896 So. 2d at 791; Ins. Concepts and Design, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 1234. 
66 See, e.g., Flagship Resort Dev. Corp. v. Interval Int’l, Inc., 28 So. 3d 915, 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010); Ins. Concepts and Design, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 1234; Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1098. 
67 Ins. Concepts and Design, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 1234; Burger King Corp., 169 F.3d at 1316; 
Hospital Corp. of America v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 710 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The 
Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida has even gone to the extent of stating that a breach of the implied 
covenant is not recognized in Florida where the plaintiff alleges a wrongful dismissal. Kelly v. Gill, 544 
So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
68 Snow, 896 So. 2d at 789. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 789–90. 
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required to report this illegal conduct under Rule 4-8.3 of the Florida Rules 
of Professional Conduct.71 
In terms of Snow’s claim under the Florida Private Sector 
Whistleblower Act, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida focused 
on the language “law, rule, or regulation” in Section 448.102(1) as defined in 
Section 448.101(4).72 Based on the definition of this language in the statute, 
the court found that the rules governing the conduct of members of the 
Florida Bar, despite being designated as “rules,” are not laws, rules, or 
regulations under Section 448.101(4) because they “do not flow from either 
a legislatively enacted statute, ordinance, or administrative rule. Neither do 
they originate from any similar federal source. Rather, [they] are promulgated 
by the Florida Supreme Court, the head of the judicial branch of state 
government, under . . . authority given . . . by . . . the Florida Constitution.”73  
Even after making this finding, the court still went on to recognize that 
the firm’s reaction “may have been inappropriate.”74 Nonetheless, the court 
refrained from deciding the case on any grounds other than the language 
contained in the Definitions section of the statute and its interpretation.75 
However, the court did acknowledge the quandary it was dealing with and 
evidently made it a point to mention that “[w]hether it is appropriate to afford 
whistle-blower protection to an attorney in Ms. Snow’s circumstance is a 
policy-making function left to the legislature.”76 
The court also imposed a restricted reach (as discussed in Part II above) 
on the implied covenant of good faith built into Snow’s at-will employment 
contract: “[t]here can be no cause of action for a breach of the implied 
covenant ‘absent an allegation that an express term of the contract has been 
breached.’”77 “[T]he duty of good faith performance does not exist until a 
plaintiff can establish a term of the contract the other party was obligated to 
perform and did not.”78 
Similar situations to that which took place in Snow have also occurred 
in other jurisdictions. In Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., shortly after 
 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 791. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 791–92 (quoting Ins. Concepts & Design, Inc. v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 785 So. 2d 1232, 
1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
78 Snow, 896 So. 2d at 792. After stating this point the court then cited a case from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit not in conformity with its construction of the implied 
covenant of good faith in Snow: Scott v. County of Ramsey, 180 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 1999) (“affirming 
the giving of a jury instruction stating that employment decisions or actions can be made for ‘a 
good reason, bad reason or no reason at all, but they cannot be based on intentional retaliation’”). 
12 - ANON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/19 7:46 PM 
1190 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:1175 
Plaintiff Alan P. Jacobson was hired as an associate with the law firm of 
Knepper & Moga, P.C., he learned that the firm had been improperly filing 
consumer debt collection actions.79 After bringing the filing practice issue to 
the attention of Knepper, a principal partner at the firm, Knepper advised 
Jacobson that the matter would be corrected.80 However, Jacobson would 
subsequently realize on two separate occasions that the firm had not ceased 
its improper filing practices at all.81 In fact, after approaching Knepper with 
his concerns for a second time, Jacobson was again informed that the issue 
would be rectified.82 And after raising the issue with Knepper for a third time, 
Jacobson was terminated about two weeks later.83 As such, Jacobson brought 
suit against the firm “alleging that he had been wrongfully discharged in 
retaliation for reporting the firm’s illegal practices to a principal partner of 
the firm.”84 
After initially denying the firm’s motion to dismiss, the circuit court 
certified the following question to the appellate court: whether an Illinois 
attorney is prevented “from maintaining a cause of action for the Tort of 
Retaliatory Discharge against his non-client law firm employer due to the 
pre-eminence of the Rules of Professional Conduct?”85 Reversing the 
appellate court’s holding that Jacobson “was not precluded from maintaining 
an action for retaliatory discharge against his employing firm,” the Illinois 
Supreme Court first recognized the “limited and narrow” scope of retaliatory 
discharge “as an exception to the general rule of at-will employment.”86 The 
court further described retaliatory discharge as an “action which seeks to 
achieve a proper balance among the employer’s interest in operating a 
business efficiently and profitably, the employee’s interest in earning a 
livelihood, and society’s interest in seeing its public policies carried out.”87 
As such, for a plaintiff to maintain a retaliatory discharge action, he “must 
demonstrate that (1) he was discharged in retaliation for his activities; and (2) 
the discharge is in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.”88 
Recognizing the lack of an exact definition of “clearly mandated public 
policy,” the court noted that its case law allows retaliatory discharge actions 
where (1) employees are terminated in response to the filing (or anticipated 
 
79 Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ill. 1998). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 493. 
88 Id. 
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filing) of Workers’ Compensation Act claims or (2) employees are 
terminated “in retaliation for the reporting of illegal or improper conduct,” or 
“whistle blowing.”89 
Turning its attention to the case before it, the court determined that the 
public policy safeguarded by the collection statutes, “that of protecting the 
debtor defendants’ property and ensuring them due process, is adequately 
safeguarded without extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to employee 
attorneys.”90 This is because licensed attorneys have professional and ethical 
obligations to report attorney misconduct, which ensures that the public 
policy under the collection statutes (that of protecting debtor defendants’ 
property and ensuring due process) will be adequately safeguarded since 
attorneys with knowledge of improper violations of the statutes are required 
to report them.91 Thus, before reversing the appellate court’s holding and 
circuit court’s order denying the motion to dismiss, the court answered the 
certified question in the affirmative and found that “an attorney licensed to 
practice in the State of Illinois is prevented from maintaining a cause of action 
for the tort of retaliatory discharge against his nonclient law firm employer 
due to the preeminence of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”92 At the same 
time, the dissent captured the essence of the dilemma surrounding the court’s 
opinion: 
Thus, one class of employees in this state, attorneys, has 
been stripped of a remedy which Illinois clearly affords to 
all other employees in such “whistle-blowing” situations. 
Today’s opinion serves as yet another reminder to the 
attorneys in this state that, in certain circumstances, it is 
economically more advantageous to keep quiet than to 
follow the dictates of the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility.93 
The Texas Supreme Court also confronted a slightly distinct, yet 
comparable situation to the situations presented in Snow and Jacobson. In 
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, after becoming a partner with the law firm of 
Butler & Binion, Attorney Colette Bohatch was given access to internal firm 
billing reports.94 Based on her review of the reports, Bohatch grew suspicious 
that the office managing partner was overbilling for his time worked and 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 494. 
93 Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
94 Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1998). 
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decided to raise the issue with another partner at the firm.95 Following the 
firm’s investigation, Bohatch was informed that her contentions had no basis 
and that she should begin seeking other employment.96 Eventually, the firm 
gave Bohatch notice to vacate her office, Bohatch initiated an action against 
the firm, and Bohatch was expelled from the partnership.97 
After a jury trial on Bohatch’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, “the court [of appeals] 
concluded that Bohatch could not recover for breach of fiduciary duty” 
because “the firm’s only duty to Bohatch was not to expel her in bad faith.”98 
Subsequently, the Texas Supreme Court set out to consider “whether the 
fiduciary relationship between and among partners creates an exception to 
the at-will nature of partnerships; that is, in this case, whether it gives rise to 
a duty not to expel a partner who reports suspected overbilling by another 
partner.”99 
Although recognizing the force behind Bohatch’s position that 
“permitting a law firm to retaliate against a partner who in good faith reports 
suspected overbilling would discourage compliance with rules of 
professional conduct and thereby hurt clients,” the court nonetheless rejected 
Bohatch’s arguments in favor of maintaining the at-will nature of 
partnerships and the importance of “personal confidence and trust” among 
partners in a partnership (that may cease to exist in instances where partners 
accuse other partners of overbilling, for example).100 At the same time, 
however, the court emphasized that “[its] refusal to create an exception to the 
at-will nature of partnerships in no way obviate[d] the ethical duties of 
lawyers,” noting the reality of dilemmas sometimes created by professional 
ethical duties (such as situations involving a partner’s knowledge of another 
partner’s overbilling practices).101 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 545. 
98 Id. (“The court of appeals stated that ‘bad faith’ in this context means only that partners cannot 
expel another partner for self-gain” and found no evidence in the present case that Bohatch was expelled 
for self-gain.). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 546. 
101 Id. at 547. 
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE LACK OF PROTECTION FROM 
EMPLOYER RETALIATION 
A. Other Jurisdictions’ Judicial Solutions  
On the other hand, various jurisdictions have responded more favorably 
to this issue. For example, in Wieder v. Skala, as a member of the New York 
State Bar, Plaintiff Wieder sued his former employing law firm for 
wrongfully discharging him as an associate “because of his insistence that 
the firm comply with the governing disciplinary rules by reporting 
professional misconduct allegedly committed by another associate.”102 The 
issue presented before the Court of Appeals of New York was “whether 
plaintiff ha[d] stated a claim for relief either for breach of contract or for the 
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of [New York’s] public policy.”103 
Wieder asserted that he had been wrongfully discharged because “of his 
insistence that L.L.’s [(a fellow associate in the firm)] misconduct be reported 
as required by DR 1-103 (A).”104 
After reviewing its employment-at-will jurisprudence, the court stated 
that “[a]ssociates are, to be sure, employees of the firm but they remain 
independent officers of the court responsible in a broader public sense for 
their professional obligations.”105 In fact, the court agreed with Wieder that 
whenever an attorney is hired 
as an associate to practice law with a firm there is implied an 
understanding so fundamental to the relationship and 
essential to its purpose as to require no expression: that both 
the associate and the firm in conducting the practice will do 
so in accordance with the ethical standards of the 
profession.106 
The court also recognized the particular importance of a mandatory 
reporting rule of professional conduct because of the unique nature of self-
regulation in the legal profession.107 As such, “by insisting that plaintiff 
disregard DR 1-103 (A) defendants were not only making it impossible for 
plaintiff to fulfill his professional obligations but placing him in the position 
 
102 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. 1992). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. The language of DR 1-103 is parallel to that of Rule 4-8.3 of the Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
105 Id. at 108. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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of having to choose between continued employment and his own potential 
suspension and disbarment.”108 The court summarized the inherent dilemma: 
Defendants, a firm of lawyers, hired plaintiff to practice law 
and this objective was the only basis for the employment 
relationship. Intrinsic to this relationship, of course, was the 
unstated but essential compact that in conducting the firm’s 
legal practice both plaintiff and the firm would do so in 
compliance with the prevailing rules of conduct and ethical 
standards of the profession. Insisting that as an associate in 
their employ plaintiff must act unethically and in violation 
of one of the primary professional rules amounted to nothing 
less than a frustration of the only legitimate purpose of the 
employment relationship.109 
Thus, the court concluded that Wieder stated a “valid claim for breach of 
contract based on an implied-in-law obligation in his relationship with 
defendants.”110 
At the same time, however, while recognizing Wieder’s persuasive 
arguments and compelling circumstances in the case, the court refrained from 
extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to the facts of the case to avoid 
significantly altering any employment relationships that the legislature would 
be better suited to handle.111 
Several years later, the New York Court of Appeals’ position in Wieder 
was confirmed and adopted by the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York in Kelly v. Hunton & Williams. In Kelly, Plaintiff Peter 
M. Kelly began working in the New York litigation department of H&W in 
October 1990.112 Around April or May of 1991, Kelly began suspecting Scott 
Wolas, a partner/rainmaker of the firm under whom he worked, of billing 
fraud.113 Around June of 1992, Kelly told Mason, another partner at the firm 
who, unbeknownst to Kelly, had been investing heavily through Wolas, about 
Wolas’s improper billing of hours not actually worked.114 In response, Mason 
told Kelly “that things are not always what they seem, and that Wolas’s 
 
108 Id. at 109. 
109 Id. at 109–10. 
110 Id. at 110. 
111 Id. 
112 Kelly v. Hunton & Williams, No. 97–CV–5631 (JG)., 1999 WL 408416, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 
17, 1999). After his first year with the firm, Kelly received considerably favorable first-year performance 
reviews along with the maximum pay raise for his class. The only major concession with his performance 
ratings appeared to be his not having passed the bar examination yet. 
113 Id. at *2. Wolas had billed for hours that he did not actually work and had also improperly 
billed a number of fictitious hours on other specific instances. 
114 Id. 
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billing was not [Kelly’s] concern.”115 Additionally, although Kelly’s work 
and habits had not been substantially criticized before speaking with Mason, 
after the conversation Kelly began to be reprimanded for tardiness, work 
performance, failing to timely finalize his bar application, and billing fewer 
hours than the other New York litigation partners (including Wolas).116 
Eventually, Kelly was asked to leave the firm and was given the option 
to either “(a) be fired immediately, without severance pay or a favorable job 
reference; or (b) announce his resignation and stay with the firm the next 
several months, which would gain him a favorable reference.”117 Given this 
ultimatum, Kelly chose the coerced resignation because he had no other 
employment or source of income readily available, would have a difficult 
time obtaining another job without a favorable H&W reference, and would 
have to disclose being fired on his bar application.118 During this time, H&W 
conducted an internal investigation and “hearing” process regarding Wolas’s 
billing practices.119 Ultimately finding that Wolas had not committed billing 
fraud, the firm also decided that its “determination that fraud had not been 
clearly established extinguished the obligation to report not only for the firm, 
but for the associates as well” (even in light of the New York Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Wieder v. Skala).120 
Several years after leaving H&W and receiving various job references 
from the firm that were less than completely favorable, Kelly sued H&W 
alleging that [it] breached implied contractual obligations 
owed him when it terminated his employment with the firm. 
Specifically, [he claimed] that H&W forced him to resign 
and implicitly threatened to withhold a favorable job 
reference, in order to impede and discourage him from 
reporting . . . Wolas’s billing fraud to the Disciplinary 
Committee.121 
In deciding H&W’s motion for summary judgment, the court recognized that 
Kelly was an at-will employee and that under New York law could be 
terminated at any time for any or no reason.122 However, Kelly’s position was 
that his termination fell within the exception established in Wieder v. Skala, 
where the New York Court of Appeals held that an at-will associate can bring 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at *2–3. 
117 Id. at *4. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at *4–5. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at *1, *5. 
122 Id. at *6. 
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a cause of action “against his firm for breach of contract based on the firm’s 
discharging him for his insistence that the firm comply with the Code of 
Professional Responsibility by reporting to the Disciplinary Committee the 
professional misconduct of another [lawyer].”123 Over H&W’s argument that 
Wieder was inapplicable because Kelly had not yet passed the bar (and so 
was not subjected to attorney disciplinary rules), the court determined that 
the Wieder cause of action does extend to “unadmitted law graduates working 
as associates in law firms.”124 The court reasoned that “it would be anomalous 
to permit . . . [unadmitted] associates to ignore unethical behavior that 
admitted associates are required to report” because of the close similarities 
between the functions, treatment, responsibilities, evaluation, and payment 
of unadmitted and admitted associates.125 Thus, the court rejected the notion 
that unadmitted associates cannot “face the dilemma of having to choose 
between continued employment at a firm and compliance with lawyers’ 
disciplinary rules.”126 As in Wieder, the court acknowledged (as applicable 
to unadmitted associates) the same ethical responsibilities and duties 
belonging to lawyers as members of the self-regulated legal profession and 
the “implied-in-law obligation[s]” firms owe to their lawyers.127 
Lastly, the court further rejected H&W’s contentions that (1) an 
associate must report or threaten to report to the disciplinary committee as a 
prerequisite to avail himself of the Wieder cause of action, and (2) Wieder is 
inapplicable to situations where the only retaliation for reporting the associate 
would suffer is an unfavorable job reference (and not termination).128 First, 
the court explained that while an “associate’s stated intention to go to the 
disciplinary authorities may be powerful circumstantial evidence of the 
firm’s intent to punish and/or silence him . . . it is neither dispositive nor 
necessary to the associate’s claim.”129 Second, the court stated that retaliation 
in the form of unfavorable job references “can effectively prevent” an 
associate from securing future employment, which thus places him in a 
situation comparable to the Wieder scenario “of having to choose between 
continued employment and the consequences of failing to comply with 
[mandatory reporting rules].”130 
Ultimately, the court’s final sentence of the opinion before the denial of 
H&W’s summary judgment motion recognizes the possibility that “a rational 
 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *6–7. 
125 Id. at *7. 
126 Id. at *8. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *8–9. 
129 Id. at *9. 
130 Id. 
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jury could conclude that H&W fired plaintiff because he had insisted on 
airing Wolas’s fraud, and implicitly conditioned its favorable references to 
prospective future employers on plaintiff’s keeping quiet about that fraud.”131 
This powerful statement captures the harsh realities facing associates when 
they are put in these “Catch-22” scenarios and must choose between the 
losing options of either (a) remaining quiet in the face of ethical misconduct 
and mandatory reporting requirements (while also risking disciplinary 
actions against them), or (b) reporting or threatening to report misconduct in 
the face of employment retaliation often without any available remedy 
because of their at-will employment status. 
The Supreme Court of California in General Dynamics Corp. v. 
Superior Court also recognized a potential solution in the (slightly distinct, 
yet comparable) scenario involving the termination of in-house counsel. 
After working for General Dynamics Corporation for fourteen years, 
climbing the company’s organizational ladder, and being considered for the 
positions of division vice-president and general counsel, Attorney Andrew 
Rose was terminated “abruptly and wrongfully.”132 In support of its decision 
to terminate Rose, General Dynamics’ position was that (1) Rose’s discharge 
was based on the company’s loss of “confidence in Rose’s ability to represent 
vigorously its interests” and (2) “Rose was subject to discharge at any time, 
‘for any reason or for no reason,’” because of his employment as an in-house 
attorney.133 As a result, Rose initiated an action against General Dynamics 
alleging (1) “that he was subject to discharge only for ‘good cause’” based 
on General Dynamics’ conduct and other assurances, and (2) that General 
Dynamics’ stated reasons for his termination were mere pretext with the 
company’s actual reasons stemming from a retaliatory motive against 
Rose.134 
As such, after the court of appeal’s ruling that “the complaint was 
sufficient to survive a general demurrer as to both theories of relief,” the 
supreme court granted review to consider “whether an attorney’s status as an 
employee bars the pursuit of implied-in-fact contract and retaliatory 
 
131 Id. at *10–11. 
132 General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court., 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994). 
133 Id. at 490–91. 
134 Id. Rose’s complaint alleged:  
[T]he “real” reasons motivating his firing had more to do with an attempt by company officials to 
cover up widespread drug use among the General Dynamics workforce, a refusal to investigate the 
mysterious “bugging” of the office of the company’s chief of security, and the displeasure of 
company officials over certain legal advice Rose had given them, rather than any loss of confidence 
in his legal ability or commitment to the company’s interests. 
Id. 
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discharge tort causes of action against the employer that are commonly the 
subject of suits by non-attorney employees who assert the same claims.”135 
First, the court concluded that in-house attorneys are permitted to pursue 
“just cause” contractual claims in the same way as nonattorney employees 
because these contract claims “are unlikely to implicate values central to the 
attorney-client relationship.”136 In terms of retaliatory discharge, the court 
first recognized that this cause of action arises out of employers’ implied-in-
law duty “to conduct [their] affairs in compliance with public policy.”137 
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the tort functions primarily to 
serve the public’s policy interests as opposed to the interests of any particular 
plaintiff-employee.138 Given these overarching principles, the court thus 
noted that when a plaintiff maintains a cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge, he is provided a remedy for (1) the direct purpose of being 
compensated for his loss of employment. and (2) the indirect purpose of 
“vindicating the underlying fundamental public policy itself.”139 
The court then turned its attention to analyzing the dual allegiance 
attorneys serve as a class of professionals.140 “On the one hand, an attorney’s 
highest duty is to the welfare and interests of the client. This obligation is 
channeled, however, by a limiting and specifically professional 
qualification: . . . [being] bound at all events not to transgress . . . ethical 
norms that distinguish their work from that of the nonattorney.”141 Given the 
competing forces surrounding this “duality of allegiance,” the court observed 
the possibility that situations may arise where an attorney is placed in “a 
genuine moral dilemma.”142 For example, in addition to the situations faced 
by outside counsel employed by law firms—who actually “enjoy a measure 
of professional distance and economic independence that usually serves to 
lessen the pressure to bend or ignore professional norms”—in-house counsel 
are especially susceptible to client/ethical dilemmas because of their 
employment by profit-maximization focused corporations and their 
“virtually complete dependence on the good will and confidence of a single 
employer to provide livelihood and career success.”143 Thus, taking these 
considerations in hand with the fact that attorneys’ “professional work is by 
definition affected with a public interest,” the court concluded that “in-house 
 
135 Id. at 489, 491 (alteration in original). 
136 Id. at 490. 
137 Id. at 497. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 498. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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counsel, forced to choose between the demands of the employer and the 
requirements of a professional code of ethics have, if anything, an even more 
powerful claim to judicial protection than their nonprofessional 
colleagues.”144 
The court also acknowledged the decisions of other courts that have 
concluded that in-house counsel are prevented from bringing retaliatory 
discharge actions before refusing to adopt their rationales.145 In those cases, 
the courts’ reasoning was two-fold: first finding that permitting retaliatory 
discharge actions by in-house counsel could only harm clients’ overall 
confidences in the confidential nature of matters communicated in the 
attorney-client relationship, and secondly finding that allowing such actions, 
which are based on serving fundamental public policy underpinnings, was 
redundant since attorneys already have mandatory ethical duties to safeguard 
the public’s policy interests, which therefore alleviates the need for any tort 
remedy to persuade or encourage the attorney to protect such interests.146 
With these ideas in mind, the California Supreme Court explained that they 
actually weigh in favor of permitting retaliatory discharge actions where an 
employee is terminated for adhering to or refusing to violate ethical duties: 
Granted the priest-like license to receive the most intimate 
and damning disclosures of the client, granted the sanctity of 
the professional privilege, granted the uniquely influential 
position attorneys occupy in our society, it is precisely 
because of that role that attorneys should be accorded a 
retaliatory discharge remedy in those instances in which 
mandatory ethical norms embodied in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct collide with illegitimate demands of 
the employer and the attorney insists on adhering to his or 
her clear professional duty. It is, after all, the office of the 
retaliatory discharge tort to vindicate fundamental public 
policies by encouraging employees to act in ways that 
advance them. By providing the employee with a remedy in 
tort damages for resisting socially damaging organizational 
conduct, the courts mitigate the otherwise considerable 
 
144 Id. (explaining that “it is virtually certain that, without the prospect of limited judicial access, 
in-house attorneys . . . confronted with the dilemma of choosing between adhering to professional ethical 
norms and surrendering to the employer’s unethical demands will almost always find silence the better 
part of valor. Declining to provide a limited remedy under defined circumstances will thus almost certainly 
foster a degradation of in-house counsel’s professional stature.”) (alteration in original). 
145 Id. at 500–01. 
146 Id. at 500. 
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economic and cultural pressures on the individual employee 
to silently conform.147 
As further support for its position, the court also pointed to several cases 
such as Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc. and Wieder v. Skala that have 
likewise identified “the importance of professional ethical codes as a 
counterweight to employer overreaching.”148 Lastly, before affirming the 
court of appeal’s judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings, 
the court explained the qualified and limited nature of its holding and the 
practicalities surrounding it: 
In addition to retaliatory discharge claims founded on 
allegations that an in-house attorney was terminated for 
refusing to violate a mandatory ethical duty embodied in the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, judicial access ought 
logically extend to those limited circumstances in which in-
house counsel’s nonattorney colleagues would be permitted 
to pursue a retaliatory discharge claim and governing 
professional rules or statutes expressly remove the 
requirement of attorney confidentiality.149 
As a final example of the potential solutions reached by the courts on 
this issue, in Matzkin v. Delaney, Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, PC, 
Associate Attorney Bruce Matzkin was representing a client at trial “when he 
learned that his opposing counsel had telephoned two witnesses and told 
them that they did not have to testify in court, even though they had been 
subpoenaed.”150 While Matzkin intended to report his opposing counsel’s 
conduct to the statewide grievance committee in accordance with mandatory 
ethical reporting requirements, multiple partners at his law firm cautioned 
him against initiating any grievance without the firm’s approval.151 After 
finishing the matter against his opposing counsel and being expressly 
forbidden by his firm from filing a grievance in the firm’s name, Matzkin 
told his firm that he would independently file a grievance and was 
subsequently terminated thereafter.152 As a result, Matzkin initiated a 
wrongful discharge action against his firm alleging that he was terminated to 
 
147 Id. at 501 (alteration in original). 
148  Id. at 501–02 (citing Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1989)). 
149 Id. at 502–05 (alteration in original). 
150 Matzkin v. Delaney, Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, PC, No. CV0440002885, 2005 
WL 2009277, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29, 2005). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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be prevented from filing a grievance, and the firm responded by filing a 
motion to strike.153 
In deciding the motion to strike, the court first recognized the inherent 
focus on public policy surrounding the wrongful discharge cause of action, 
which exists to provide a remedy in situations where an employee’s 
“discharge involved impropriety derived from some important violation of 
public policy.”154 Accordingly, where a plaintiff employee claims he was 
wrongfully discharged, he must allege whether “his discharge violated any 
explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or . . . contravened any 
judicially conceived notion of public policy.”155 
Analyzing this requirement, the court determined that “the Rules of 
Professional Conduct are a judicially conceived public policy” and further 
supported its finding in the following ways: (1) citing a federal district court 
case from the District of Connecticut that concluded that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court would acknowledge a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct as a “public policy violation . . . sufficient to support a wrongful 
discharge cause of action;”156 (2) noting that the Connecticut Supreme Court 
“has found clear statements of public policy in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in other instances;” (3) citing the New York Court of Appeals’ 
Wieder v. Skala decision; and (4) citing language in the preamble to the Rules 
of Professional Conduct indicating the Rules’ concern for the public’s policy 
interests.157 Along these lines, the court also rejected the firm’s argument 
“that the preamble of the Rules . . . explicitly states the rules are not intended 
to be a basis of civil liability” by explaining that while the firm’s position 
accurately reflected the intent of the Rules, this does not necessarily bar the 
Rules from “embody[ing] a public policy of sufficient clarity or consequence 
to justify a claim for wrongful discharge against a lawyer’s employer.”158 
Ultimately, the court held that given the self-regulated nature of the legal 
profession, “no lawyer’s employment should be conditioned upon turning a 
blind eye to violations of the Rules which are applicable to all lawyers. To 
allow this would compromise the autonomy of the profession.”159 As such, 
 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *2. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. (quoting Lewis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:02CV512 (RNC), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5126, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2003)). 
157 Id. at *2–3. 
158 Id. at *4. 
159 Id. 
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the court found that the Rules of Professional Conduct are an important 
public policy and denied the firm’s motion to strike.160 
B. Analysis of Judicial Solutions and Discussion of Other 
Nonjudicial Solutions 
As set forth above, Snow v. Ruden, McClosky et al., Florida’s at-will 
employment doctrine, and the silence of the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct currently exacerbate the existing tension between Rule 4-8.3(a)’s 
mandatory reporting requirement and the lack of protection from employer 
retaliation for lawyers who report or insist on reporting the misconduct of 
other lawyers. However, through the application of the potential judicial and 
nonjudicial solutions presented in this Comment, Florida lawyers will no 
longer be “left out in the cold” when confronted with the ironic paradox of 
reporting under Rule 4-8.3(a) and being retaliated against by law firm 
employers for adhering to the mandatory reporting rule without any 
protection. 
First, like the courts in General Dynamics Corp. and Matzkin, Florida 
courts should similarly recognize a tort cause of action for retaliatory or 
wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy when an attorney is 
retaliated against for adhering to the mandatory obligations imposed by Rule 
4-8.3(a).161 The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct undeniably “express 
clear and specific public policy.”162 Rather than simply serving as “mere 
internal regulations of the profession,” the Florida Rules exist to “define the 
minimal standards applicable to lawyers,” which serve the public’s interest 
in the overall integrity of the legal profession.163 As a result, the Florida Rules 
“embody a public policy of sufficient clarity or consequence to justify a claim 
for wrongful discharge against a lawyer’s employer.”164 Accordingly, Florida 
courts—like the courts in other jurisdictions—should finally progress 
Florida’s at-will employment doctrine towards recognizing the tort of 
retaliatory or wrongful discharge in situations where improper employer 
retaliation negatively impacts significant public policy concerns, such as the 
 
160 Id. The court also agreed with the position that a plaintiff employee does not have to take action 
(such as actually reporting the misconduct) “to vindicate the important public policy.” Id. 
161 See also Kirik, supra note 5, at 408 (“Private law firm attorneys wrongfully discharged for 
refusing to violate their professional code of ethics should be allowed a cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge. Courts should recognize a ‘public policy by professional code exception’ to the at-will 
employment of an attorney-employee in private practice.”). 
162 Id. (referring to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility). 
163 Id. at 409. 
164 Matzkin, 2005 WL 2009277, at *4. 
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potential non-adherence to the mandatory reporting provision of the Florida 
Rules of Professional Conduct.165 
Second, the Florida Legislature has ignored the conflict lingering before 
it: a law firm’s unfettered ability to retaliate against at-will attorneys who 
adhere to Rule 4-8.3(a) jeopardizes attorney adherence to the Florida Rules 
of Professional Conduct and the public’s confidence in the legal 
profession.166 As such, given the public’s policy interest in lawyers’ 
adherence to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, the Florida courts’ 
unwillingness to recognize the common law cause of action for retaliatory or 
wrongful discharge, and the Snow court’s direct call to the legislature to 
determine whether whistleblower protection should be afforded to attorneys 
like Plaintiff Snow,167 the Florida Legislature should step in to resolve this 
issue by redrafting the Definitions section of the Florida Private Sector 
Whistleblower Act to include the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct into 
the definition of “[l]aw, rule, or regulation.” 
The Snow court’s holding provides the Florida Legislature with the 
perfect platform to amend the Florida Private Sector Whistleblower Act to 
resolve this issue. The legislature could declare that the Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct—rules adopted by a co-equal branch of government 
(the Florida Supreme Court) acting pursuant to its constitutional authority to 
regulate the legal profession168—are now included within the statute as 
protected “rules” for which attorney adherence cannot be retaliated against 
by employers without consequence. In this way, the legislature would resolve 
the existing conundrum that is the lack of protection from employer 
retaliation for following a mandatory rule of professional conduct. 
Third, like the courts in Wieder and Kelly, Florida courts should allow 
at-will attorneys to sue for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing when their law firm employers retaliate against them for adhering 
to Rule 4-8.3(a). As stated in Wieder, when a law firm hires an attorney to 
practice law, “there is implied an understanding so fundamental to the 
relationship and essential to its purpose as to require no expression: that both 
the associate and the firm in conducting the practice will do so in accordance 
with the ethical standards of the profession.”169 And as should further go 
without saying, the fundamental purpose surrounding the relationship 
 
165 Kirik, supra note 5, at 409 (“To deny an attorney-employee of a private law firm a remedy for 
adhering to his professional ethics does not encourage respect for the law. It weeds out the honest 
attorneys.”). 
166 See Long, supra note 55, at 1065. 
167 See Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 896 So. 2d 787, 791 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
168 See Long, supra note 55, at 1082. 
169 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. 1992). 
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between associate and law firm is non-waivable. Accordingly, the fact that 
Florida attorneys cannot waive their mandatory reporting obligation clearly 
contributes to the reality of being caught between adhering to Rule 4-8.3(a) 
and facing employer retaliation without a remedy. 
Additionally, the restrictive holding in Snow (and other Florida cases) 
regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is flawed. This 
restriction, that an express provision of the contract must be breached before 
the implied covenant applies, does not entirely make sense given that under 
such circumstances, the plaintiff’s recovery will be based on the breach of 
the express provision itself, thus making the implied covenant superfluous. 
As such, to give actual force to the implied covenant, it needs to be applicable 
in situations like Snow where the ethical practice of law is inherently built 
into the at-will attorney’s employment relationship with an employing law 
firm.170 Therefore, it appears to be axiomatic that Florida at-will attorneys 
should be able to sue for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing when their law firm employers retaliate against them for adhering 
to Rule 4-8.3(a). 
Fourth, the Florida Supreme Court should draft a new rule (or 
alternatively include as a provision or comment under Rule 4-8.4, 
Misconduct) in the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct proscribing 
employer retaliation against an at-will attorney who adheres to Rule 4-
8.3(a).171 The goal of the new rule or addition of a provision or comment 
under Rule 4-8.4172 would be the deterrence of employer retaliation via the 
consequences of disciplinary action or suspension under the Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct.173 Although this solution would not serve as an 
affirmative remedy for at-will attorneys retaliated against by their employing 
law firms, it would certainly resolve the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct’s silence on the issue of employer retaliation against at-will 
attorneys. Furthermore, with an express statement built into the Florida 
Rules, it would seem to follow that the possibility of disciplinary action or 
suspension would deter law firms and employing attorneys from retaliating 
against an at-will attorney. As such, law firms would have to “think twice” 
before taking adverse employment action against an at-will attorney just 
because they can under the current state of the law.  
 
170 See id. 
171 See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1850–51. 
172 See id. at 1846 (explaining that the parallel misconduct rule under the Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility, Rule 8.4, would be “broad enough to encompass conduct aimed at 
discouraging or punishing associates who intend to or who actually honor the [Model] Rule 8.3(a) 
reporting mandate.”). 
173 See id. at 1851. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Preamble to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct establishes 
lawyers as “officers of the court” and recognizes the self-governing nature of 
the legal profession. As such, in addition to requiring adherence to the rules, 
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct also endow all lawyers with the 
responsibility of ensuring other lawyers’ adherence to the rules. This charge 
of responsibility is directly stated in Rule 4-8.3(a), which explicitly requires 
“[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects [to] 
inform the appropriate professional authority.” 
However, although Rule 4-8.3(a) requires lawyers to report such 
misconduct, the Rules fail to provide any express protection for lawyers who 
are retaliated against by employers because they report (or insist on 
reporting) the misconduct of other lawyers. Furthermore, Florida courts do 
not recognize the common law tort cause of action for retaliatory or wrongful 
discharge; the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida has also held that 
Florida lawyers are precluded from redress under Florida’s Private Sector 
Whistleblower Act when they are retaliated against by an employer for 
adhering to (or insisting on adherence to) Florida’s mandatory reporting 
requirement; and Florida courts will not find a breach of the contractual 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (unless an express term of the 
at-will employment contract has been breached) in situations where at-will 
lawyers are similarly retaliated against. 
As a result, for Rule 4-8.3(a) to have full force and reach its potential of 
being an affirmative vehicle for self-regulation of the legal profession, 
attorneys need to feel confident that they will have protection or a remedy if 
they face retaliatory employment consequences for adhering to the 
mandatory duty to report misconduct. However, given Florida’s current 
stance on the issue, at-will attorneys are likely to find themselves hesitating 
before confidently following their duty to report misconduct under Rule 4-
8.3(a). The result is an overall negative toll on the integrity of the legal 
profession. Accordingly, Florida courts should, “[i]n exercising their 
common law powers, . . . not kneel in blind obedience to . . . misguided 
reliance on precedent. [T]hey [should] seek in every case a just resolution, 
identifying those circumstances that lay claim to conscience, considered in 
light of applicable principles of law.”174 
 
174 General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 494 (Cal. 1994) (alteration in 
original). 
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Thus, given these maxims and considering the tension between Rule 4-
8.3(a)’s mandatory reporting requirement and the lack of protection from 
employer retaliation for lawyers who report or insist on reporting the 
misconduct of other lawyers, (1) Florida courts should recognize in such 
situations a tort cause of action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge in 
contravention of public policy, (2) the Florida Legislature should redraft the 
Definitions section of the Florida Private Sector Whistleblower Act to 
include the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct into the definition of 
“[l]aw, rule, or regulation,” (3) Florida courts should allow claims for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to at-will 
lawyers’ employment contracts in such situations, or (4) the Florida Supreme 
Court should draft a new rule (or alternatively include as a provision or 
comment under Rule 4-8.4, Misconduct) in the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct proscribing such employer retaliation. 
 
